

**Reforms Overview
2016–2017**

p. 2

**Why Ukraine needs
civilian oversight
over its military**

p. 6

**Rolandas Kiškis
on reforming
the NCO corps**

p. 10



OVERVIEW OF DEFENCE REFORMS IN UKRAINE

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STATUS OF REFORMS

IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE AND THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

1

LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE

Over 100 legal and other regulatory acts, including the State Program for the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2020, were adopted in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada and the Government of Ukraine.

On January 17, 2018 the Draft Law of Ukraine “On the National Security of Ukraine” was considered and approved during the regular session of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine containing all the recommendations of the Ministry of Defence.

The Draft Law provide for:

- **Foundations and principles of national policy** in the field of national security and defence, with due consideration for potential membership in the EU and NATO
- Mechanisms for the development of democratic civilian control over the security and defence sector, including the **establishment of preconditions for a civilian Ministry of Defence**
- **Command and control system** of the Armed Forces, including the delineation of tasks, functions, authorities, responsibilities and accountability of the Minister of Defence, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff, the Joint Force Commander, the Service Commanders, etc.

2

DEFENCE REFORM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The dedicated structural unit is established within the Department of Defence Policy, Strategic Planning and International Cooperation to manage the defence reform aspects.

The Ukrainian component of the Multinational Joint Coordination Committee is integrated into the Reforms Committee.

3

MANNING OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE WITH HIGHLY TRAINED AND MOTIVATED SERVICEMEN



A total of **36.7 thousand people** were enlisted on the contract basis, including **around 2.5 thousand officers**.





The operational reserve of the Armed Forces currently amounts to **140 thousand people**, including **113 thousand people** that belong to a first line reserve.



4

FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES

The Ministry of Defence used a total of **99.9%** of the financial recourses allocated for 2017.



5

PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH NATO

10
BATTALIONS

25
COMPANIES

>1400
NATIONAL INSTRUCTORS

WERE TRAINED
UNDER NATO
STANDARDS

THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE AND THE
ARMED FORCES
OF UKRAINE

67
ADVISORS

FROM
NATO MEMBER-
STATES

14 **6**
HIGH-LEVEL
STRATEGIC
ADVISORS

The Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine is currently implemented, including through the use of **eight** NATO Trust Funds.

6

WEAPONS, MILITARY AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT



THE ARMED
FORCES RECEIVED

1 400

new and modernized
pieces of weapons
and military equipment



A TOTAL
OF

21

new types of military
equipment were
adopted



THE NAVY
RECEIVED

4

Gurza Class
Small Armored
Artillery Boats



OVER

11 000

pieces of weapons
of equipment were repaired
using the facilities
of the Armed Forces

Ukraine intensified the military-technical cooperation with foreign partners, primarily with the US, Canada, Poland and Lithuania.

The National Procurement Plan for 2018 is increased to the level of **UAH 21.3 billion**, which is **37% higher** if compared with 2017.



7

MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE



Around **50** military infrastructure facilities were returned under control of the Ministry of Defence.



The construction of the brigade-size garrison is started at the 235th Joint Training Center in Shyrokyi Lan.



The Simulation Center is commissioned at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center.



The construction, reconstruction and major repair works are currently in progress at **293** facilities.



The training facilities are restored at **2 new** (205th Tactical Medicine Training Center in Desna and Military Law Enforcement Training Center in Lviv) and **9 existing** training centers.



The development of the Joint Training Center for Rocket and Artillery Forces, the Air Defence Training Center of the Army, the Cavalry Training Center and the SOF Training Facility are in progress.

8

MILITARY INCENTIVES



The amount of allowances for operating inside the ATO zone was increased to

UAH 10 000



A total of **1 043** apartments were distributed among military the personnel, including 489 ATO participants (15 of them are wounded)



Over **180** residential complexes are being built to house over 23 000 contracted servicemen

9

NEW DEFENCE PLANNING SYSTEM

- The foundations for the capability based defence planning are developed.
- The Unified Capability Catalog of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Ukraine is approved.
- A total of **333** experts in defence and strategic planning were trained.

10

LOGISTICS SYSTEM

- The Main Logistics Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is established.
- The experiment with the food supply system is completed, resulting in **23** units to adopt a new food supply system. Another **51** units are planned to join the new food supply system this year. The number of approved food products is increased to **355**.

11

MEDICAL SYSTEM

The Main Military Medical Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is established as a single agency responsible for medical support at the strategic level.

The Military Rehabilitation Center for service personnel is established at the Sports Training Center of the Ministry of Defence in Tysovets.

A total of **6** specialized rehabilitation departments are established (**490** beds). The rehabilitation capacity is increased to **1 500** beds

The medical rehabilitation facilities treated over **11 000** people over the past year.

130 medical vehicles (**100** Bohdan class vehicles and **30** MT-LB-S) were supplied to the Armed Forces

Another **40** medical Humvees, **16 000** first aid kits, and anesthesia apparatus were received as part of the international assistance



12

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Over **40%** of structural units in the General Staff and other command and control agencies were reformed as per standard NATO staff organization

The number of brigade (regiment) and battalion-level tactical exercises was increased by **65%**

A total of **109** command staff exercises as well as 32 brigade and 12 flight tactical exercises were conducted under NATO standards

The representatives of other components of the security and defence sector were involved with **30** exercises

A total of **668** NATO (204 strategic level documents, 83 operational level documents, and 381 tactical level documents)

and **975** national standards are used for training in the Armed Forces

12

EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS

CREATED IN 2016-2017



The Military Institute of Armoured Troops



The State Institute for Testing and Certification of Weapons and Military Equipment



Three military academic departments

The share of practical lessons in the training of cadets for aviation, mechanized, artillery, armor or air defence departments

was increased to **65%**



KEY OBJECTIVES FOR 2018

1. Appointment of the civilian Minister of Defence, Deputy Ministers, State Secretary, and heads of structural units in the Ministry of Defence
2. Reform in the General Staff of the Armed Forces
3. Verification of the future command and control system of the Armed Forces based on the new division of functions and responsibilities since the establishment of the positions for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Joint Forces Commander
4. Further implementation of the capabilities-based defence planning system
5. Increased supply of new and modernized weapons and equipment to the Armed Forces
6. Further development of logistics and medical supply systems
7. Restoration and development of military infrastructure
8. Increase of social protection for service personnel
9. Fight against corruption, more discipline and rule of law in the Armed Forces
10. Prepare for a defence review and draft the Concept for Long-Term Development of the Armed Forces



CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF UKRAINE'S ARMED FORCES:

KEY PERSPECTIVES

One of the most important reforms for Ukraine's Armed Forces is the introduction of civilian democratic control. Experts in the field say that if civilian officials in the Ministry of Defence are making some of the decisions, this will reduce corruption and free up the military leadership to work on operational planning instead of being bogged down on bureaucratic matters. To prevent manipulation, explanations are needed of what civilian democratic control of the AFU means, how it will be implemented, and what the role is of individual citizens. All this in a conversation with Olesia Favorska, project coordinator at the MOD Reforms Project Office.

Ukraine has undertaken international obligations to establish democratic control over its military, in particular, in such documents as "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document", "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine", as well as the "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security" approved at the 1994 Budapest Summit of the OSCE.

Democratic civilian control is an integral part of the broader civil-military relations that govern the relationship between citizens, the state and military; therefore, by definition, individual citizens are its participants. To put it briefly, in the classical sense, effective civilian democratic control means turning the Armed Forces into an institution that is open, understandable to society, and operates within the law. The armed forces are subordinate to a democratically elected government, with oversight provided by the media and civil society organizations having access to information. Therefore, control must be "democratic" by definition.

The principle of "civiliansness" is ensured by the rule of civilian executive and leg-

islative bodies and the judicial system. Parliament, as a rule, makes key decisions on the declaration of war and peace. It passes laws on defence policy, thus controlling it, and also exercises control over defence spending through the budget process.

The role of civil society, or "public" control, is also part of this system. It is more oversight than control. In a mature civil society, oversight is provided, as a rule, primarily by the mass media, followed by NGOs, and independent think tanks through civilian academic expertise and strategic analysis. Thus, the public, not being systematically involved in decision-making on the Armed Forces, can influence the process.

A separate component of democratic civilian control is control over the rights of military personnel, human and civil rights while serving in the military. I'm not an expert in this field, but having studied the international experience, I can say that most often there is a separate institution of the commissioner for the rights of military personnel (ombudsman) and an independent service of the general inspectorate of the armed forces.

So the structure is as follows: democracy is provided through a representative democracy and an elected government that controls the AFU; civiliansness because this is a civilian government (in



particular, the defence minister and his deputies should be civilians – but more about this later), the public – through the role of the press and NGOs, and the ombudsman or general inspectorate, are responsible for securing the rights of military personnel. If you were to say that Ukraine has had all this in the past, you'd be almost 100% right. The question is how effective it all is.

The system of democratic control has since 2003 been regulated by the Law “On Democratic Civilian Control of State Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies”. Provisions on democratic civilian control were also included in the new national security law.

International experts on democratic control of the security and defence sector have recognized the unique role of civil society in Ukraine, namely volunteers. On the one hand, the constructive direct influence of civil society on Ukraine's defence policy is unique. From the perspective of a consolidated democracy, this state is the highest value. This must continue and become stronger.

On the other hand, the fact that in 2014-2015 volunteers helped supply uniforms, flak vests, sleeping bags, medicines, vehicles and parts, and night vision devices is a sign and direct consequence of the previous systemic crisis: a combination of the deliberate destruction of the armed forces and ineffective management in the absence of civilian democratic control and oversight, and proper attention to this issue by civil society.

Starting in June 2014, I was personally involved in a unique volunteer medical initiative to provide first aid kits that began with fundraising and assembly, to delivery “wherever needed”. And today, from the “height” of 2017 I can see how much has changed qualitatively in the Armed Forces. Supply, training, transition to a contract army, start of capabilities-based planning, adoption of strategic documents on defence reform with clear goals and a roadmap for reaching them. Even though there are “growing pains”, shortcomings and delays, it is all evidence of deep and irreversible systemic changes.

I believe that having had this unique direct experience, civil society and volunteers should be involved in systemic changes.

A unique example of volunteer involvement is the development of the unmanned aviation capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I should also mention the legal assistance that the NGO “Legal Hundred” has been providing for three years to those mobilized and demobilized, contract personnel and veterans, the work of the Volunteer Council, and, most importantly, the local NGOs and volunteer organizations in Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Mariupol and other cities that have long outgrown the role of “rapid responders” providing military units, hospitals and affected populations with what they need, to become powerful and effective participants of civilian-military relations, effective organizers of cooperation between military units, local administration, business and concerned citizens.



Olesia Favorska
Coordinator of professionalization and military reserve projects of the MOD Reforms Project Office

Public councils were created in the ministry for this very reason. Is this format also democratic civilian control?

The Public Council, Reforms Office and Volunteer Council are all elements of democratic control. In theory, if the Public Council were properly organized and adhered to the principles of transparency and accountability (what the Ministry of Health (MOH) Public Council is trying to do now), this would be a great platform for public control by society.

This is a legalized civil society organization that is both legally and formally recognized by the Government and the

Ministry of Defence as an informational-analytical, advisory, intermediary body created to facilitate public participation in the shaping and implementation of defence policy.

To restore the authority, trust and respect of the Ministry of Defence Public Council, we suggested having an open online vote on the MOD website the same effective way the MOH and National Anti-Corruption Bureau held competitions to form their public councils. The process includes submission of candidates, publication of NGO activity reports for the previous year, biographies, and, importantly, candidates' letters of motivation, as well as providing access to the voting protocol and ability to search for your vote.

If you hire professional managers from the civilian world, you need to pay them accordingly. Civilians working in the Ministry of Defence are currently paid much less than military staff.

It's a matter of attracting valuable specialists to civil service in general, not just the defence ministry. And how do you train them in defence issues if you don't hire retired or reserve personnel? But then how do you update staff and bring in real civilian expertise? Perhaps this is something that can be done within the framework of the Public Administration Reform Strategy until 2020. This strategy could have another important implication for the Ministry of Defence – implementation of an approved structure, division of political and administrative functions, creation of directorates, increased role for the Department of State Policy, Strategy and International Cooperation.

According to the strategic defence bulletin, by 2020 the minister and his deputies should be civilians. How will this happen? Will Stepan Poltorak resign from the military and remain minister,



or will this be some other person, who will somehow be chosen?

The strategic bulletin doesn't say "how". There is only operational goal 1.1. – to appoint a civilian defence minister, deputy ministers, state secretary and heads of structural divisions of the Ministry of Defence apparatus by 2018.

There are different models of a civilian minister in the world. In some countries a civilian with no connection to the military is appointed minister, and he or she can be an effective manager. There are countries where their "civilianness" comes after leaving military service for a certain period, so as to "civilians" a person mentally and ensure they have lost their ties from professional military service and the principle of "unity of command". The extent to which this is possible and whether it's just a formal requirement is debatable. But if you take the United States, for example, the defence secretary is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Sometimes, his previous military experience is valued, like with current Secretary Mattis; sometimes it is a purely political appointment, as in the case of Rumsfeld.

By the way, when Mattis was appointed defence secretary, it was thought this was the first sign of a retreat from this "civilians" of the military and the principles of civilian control in general, since it was less than 7 years since he left the military. I look at this differently. I see it as the best sign of the effectiveness of civilian democratic control, because it happened through the system of check and balances with voting by both chambers of Congress, meaning political consensus. Therefore, it shows the effectiveness of this mechanism of the dominance of civilian decision-making over the military.

It is very important that effective democratic civilian control makes the military and civilian allies, not opponents. Harmonious "integrated" management in this case is possible when decisions on defence policy and planning, at least at the strategic level, are made either by civilian managers, with the expert opinion of the military playing a proper role, or collectively, depending on the specific area of responsibility. And this requires that civilian and military knowledge be valued evenly – as diverse but equal.

In any case, this means building the professional capacity of civilian staff and the professionalism of civilian experts when making decisions on defence policy. And this can only happen if there are highly competent civil servants. Obviously, democratic control can't take place without civilian experts, who, being experts in their professions, also have a deep understanding of the military.

What is the role of the Reforms Office in ensuring democratic civilian control?

The reforms office, as an advisory body created by the order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine, is staffed by civilian experts, and is in itself an element of democratic civilian control in the form of civilian expertise contributed to the implementation of reforms in the Armed Forces and introduction of better methods of management, in particular project management.

We are also part of the reforms committee, which coordinates, monitors and assesses defence reform. And it is within the framework of operational goal 1.1 "Democratic civilian control of defence forces by increasing effectiveness of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and strengthening relations with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and civil society" that we are implementing a joint project to strengthen democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

This is one of our priority projects. In 2017 our task was to prepare effective mechanisms of democratic control, and this year we focused on drafting a concept and discussing it with all participants – military, experts and civil society – at six round tables in various cities of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Lviv, Mariupol and Kyiv). We focused our work on civilian management with a stronger role for the State Secretary, openness of the ministry to dialogue between the AFU and society, and securing the rights of military personnel.

But during the round tables, the strongest interest was in the topic of strengthening the rights of military personnel and mechanisms of processing requests, appeals and complaints.

In the democratic control project there is the thesis that "a service member is

a citizen in uniform". This is the German model. This means that on the one hand, you have all your rights and obligations as a citizen, but when you are in uniform you have certain restrictions, and these restrictions must be spelled out (on freedom of expression, membership or participation in organizations, political parties and military organizations).

Do we have something similar outlining these restrictions on freedoms?

I think there are laws and statutory documents on restrictions, but I don't think we have one specific document that addresses this issue. As for the restriction on dissemination of information – this is also an internal communications issue.

This shouldn't be an issue of self-control by the military in expressing their own opinions. It's a matter of management, which develops instructions and provides personnel with training on these issues. And also determining responsibility for this. It's not the problem of a soldier, sergeant or junior officer – it's the problem of the absence or presence of clear policy and explaining it to personnel.

There is also another component of the "citizen in uniform". It's not a matter of what he can't do in terms of his professional activities, but how his civil rights are secured. Because he serves in the Armed Forces, he has certain restrictions even of a purely physical nature; nevertheless, he must have access to his civil rights, and at very least his human rights.

We have the institution of the ombudsman on the parliamentary level. For example, if a service member is discriminated against and he believes his human rights are restricted during military service, what options does he have? He can write a report to his commander.

But if his commander is the one restricting him, then he calls the hotline – but it's operated by the MOD. The case is handled within the ministry, and it follows the same line. Do you think the service member will trust this process and want to lodge a complaint?

He should have another point of entry, an alternative line to his commanders. This is a tool to safeguard his rights.



So we don't need a military ombudsman? A civilian commissioner on military rights is sufficient?

The status of the ombudsman is important, because he must have certain procedural powers. In Ukraine, the Representative of the Commissioner for Protection of Rights of Military Personnel handles the rights of the military. He operates in two areas: monitoring visits to military units and review of complaints, appeals and reports in the media of civil rights violations.

According to the annual report for 2016, the office of the representative for the protection of the rights of military personnel received I think just over 700 appeals, and only about 10% were from active military personnel. This comes out to two appeals per day. This doesn't mean there aren't any problems, it means that there is insufficient awareness and trust. Once we reach 100 appeals a week, then it'll mean there is a level of trust. The role of the ombudsman, as a second point of entry, to this day is still partially carried out by volunteers.

Therefore, the institution of the ombudsman, as a tool for securing the rights of military personnel must be developed. We examined several models. We considered the Canadian experience for a transitional model.

Their ombudsman for the rights of military personnel is in the structure of the

defence ministry. He is independent and reports directly to the minister. In Ukraine, it will take more than a year to create a separate parliamentary ombudsman for the rights of military personnel. It requires not only changing legislation, but also the Constitution.

That's why this isn't the best option for us. But how effective and how much trust will there be in an independent ombudsman who is within the MOD structure? That's the question. We discussed the idea of a military ombudsman on the ministry level with international experts, and, in principle, they support it as a transitional model.

What is the school of defence management and whose initiative is it?

The idea for the project came out of a meeting between a representative of the British defence ministry and the Ukrainian defence minister in summer 2016. The idea is to create a centre that will teach the senior leadership the necessary managerial skills, which, as a rule, didn't exist in the armed forces of post-Soviet countries.

This is knowledge that you get in business schools: strategic analysis, risk management, change management, planning, programming and project management, strategic communication. And also widening the understanding of leadership and management of the security and defence sector in the broader strategic context.

The Ukrainian military, like its civil servants, weren't taught this. Meanwhile, civilian and military education was integrated everywhere. How do you make reforms if you don't understand change management? There are many concepts that are new to us. There needs to be a platform that creates this.

We are working on a concept. I was always a proponent of this being at the Chernyakhovsky Defence University, because it has the proper regulatory and legal foundations: it has state accreditation and a state license to provide training to officers and civil servants. In addition, this is an opportunity to develop specialists who were educated abroad. There are many of them, and we are not taking full advantage of their knowledge. I saw how Georgia did this, and how it's done in the UK.

The courses are short and are built on a modular system. One module last 3-4 days. The first module teaches you the basics. You can choose an in-depth course or, if necessary, a more strategic level that focuses on several areas.

And who will be teaching?

Our foreign partners together with us. That is, they will work together with our staff to design the program. The British used the same model in Indonesia. They started a master's program, went to Indonesia and developed the program together with the Indonesians, taught it together the first year, helped organize the administration of the program, and then said: "Well done. Now you're on your own". And now they go there once a year to control the quality of work.

Our international partners are putting a lot of money and effort into bringing their courses and programs to Ukraine. Some are more effective, others less so, but they came, taught, and what were we left with? This is not an investment in the development of our own educational potential.

I hope the first stage – the pilot – will start this academic year. If we finish everything in time, we're aiming for a September launch.

Source: 112.ua



ROLANDAS KIŠKIS:

IN NATO COUNTRIES, NCOS ARE ADVISORS TO OFFICERS

Fifty-year-old Lithuanian Rolandas Kiškis has been advising Ukrainian Defence Ministry on the NCO corps development since September 2016. His country sent him to Ukraine because, as he said, “We see the importance and value of developing the NCO corps and believe that our experience in Lithuania can be useful for Ukrainian troops.” Ukrainian Week spoke with Mr. Kiškis about Ukrainian sergeants, military reform in Lithuania, and the essence of NATO requirements.

Ukrainian NCO corps reform: could you please describe the wins and shortcomings?

First of all, I would like to start with the fact that I have been working in Ukraine as an advisor on NCO development for more than one year - since last September. Lithuania assigned me here because we see the importance and value of the development of an NCO corps. We thought our

good experience in Lithuania could be useful for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

We, the NCO reforms team, have already done many things related to this area. First, one of the most prepared and successful areas is, in particular, NCO development. We have a clear vision and a way to achieve our objectives. Many important documents were prepared last year, such as the concept of NCO development, the roadmap how to implement the concept, and even a more detailed

annual plan. All these documents set a good pace for NCO corps reform.

However, what was crucial to our achievements is that we have created a good team of people willing for changes. We call it ‘the NCO team’. It includes specialists in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the MOD, even from the Cabinet of Ministers and Verkhovna Rada, of course, the Reforms Project Office and many NATO advisers and experts from different areas. And you can already see some fruits of our working together: this year a new 4-level NCO education system was approved and is being implemented, and a new instructors training system was created and approved.

They are quite close to NATO standards. Moreover, the capacity of NCO educational institutions has been strengthened by the creation of three schools for NCOs. The first one is in Desna (The Centre of Excellence for NCOs), and the other two are in Vasylykiv (for the Air Force) and Mykolaiv (for the Navy). These training centres consist of only NCOs: the chiefs



of these centres are NCOs. That is a new thing for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (it makes a huge difference).

We have some new draft laws being prepared related to NCO development. The first one is based on NATO experience and related to the NCO rank system; the law is currently in the Verkhovna Rada and will hopefully be accepted this year. Another one is related to the responsibilities and the new status of NCOs. This bill has been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers and if it goes through, it will be passed to the Rada.

Another very important bill is related to social support and, in particular, housing compensating for NCOs. It is crucial for NCO reform. One critical point to creating an NCO corps is building a system of social support, including allowances and housing support. It was proposed to change the current system: according to which (see the picture), the highest ranking NCO, who has served in the Army for 20-30 years, gets less allowance than a first-year lieutenant. However, an important agreement was reached within the MOD and General Staff that a new, more progressive system of interlinked salaries for NCOs and officers will be introduced next year. A senior NCO will be given an allowance close to a lieutenant colonel. We continue working so that next year this new system will be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers.

We are also working hard to include housing compensation. For example, when creating the NCO school in Desna, we figured out there is no possibility to get any housing for NCOs. The majority of houses are given to officers. There are no cities around where NCOs can rent an apartment. How can you attract new motivated people for the Desna NCO School without any housing support? After proposing housing compensation, the next step will be building housing for NCOs enlisted in places where there are no cities around. I hope that dormitories for NCOs will be built in 3-5 years.

On the other hand, the biggest challenge will be building new 'Officer-NCO' relations: you can prepare NCOs who are perfectly educated for the new and important roles in the Armed Forces, but if officers are not willing to let them bear such responsibilities, the reforms will be impossible. It is a two-part game. NCOs get the proper education to prove to the officers

that they are ready for the new responsibility and that they can be trusted. On the officers' side, they have to see and feel that NCOs are ready to take over additional responsibilities. This will take time.

Is this plan realistic?

It is a good question. You are always fighting to move more quickly, but still calculating if it remains realistic. The answer is Yes and No. Yes, because in many cases things are dependent on personalities. If we have the right people in the right places, we are able to implement many tasks on a realistic basis.

However, sometimes it is difficult if things are related to, for example, lawmaking – changing or preparation of new bills. You are rising to the political level and sometimes approving bills takes years, if at all success.

Many of the most difficult objectives are closely related to changes in mentality. It is easy to write down something new on paper, but when it comes to the implementation, the question arises whether it is possible to implement or adjust to the changes. That takes time: possibly a generation or even two generations. After almost 20 years of reforms, some people are still struggling to change their minds..

Can we say that the majority of reforms pass through the Rada?

I would not say that, but some critical ones are going through the parliament. What in many NATO countries could be done at lower levels (at MOD level, for instance), in Ukraine happens at high levels, and in the Rada in particular. Here decisions are taken in a more centralized way.

What is the basic difference between the NATO and Ukraine approaches to NCO training?

The essence comes from the NCO corps. 'Who are they' and 'What are they for'? In NATO countries, NCOs are people who have a huge experience of serving in the Army. They are experts in specific areas and advisors to the officers. The last ones move up and up on the career level. The NCO is a person serving longer

and having huge experience. He is closer to the soldiers and knows everything related to them. He is the best in individual training. In NATO countries, NCOs are responsible for individual training, not officers. The officers lead unit training, starting from the platoon level and higher.

Coming from that, the difference between the educations is that NCOs get a minimum of required education and training through short courses. If he wants to be a sergeant commander, he is given a month-long leader training. Then he goes to his unit where he uses the given knowledge and gains experience. He steps up the career ladder by visiting another short course. That is the essence. A bachelor's degree is required if you intend to be promoted to a position at the brigade level or higher. All NCO education and training is tied to practical skills and concrete tasks to perform. NATO's NCO training system is very flexible, it uses different types of modules and short courses.

NATO standards. Describe those briefly.

I would say there are two most important standards to be implemented during the AFU reform process. The main standard is how you treat and value your subordinates. According to the Soviet management pyramid, officers are on the top, then NCOs and soldiers. For myself, all levels are to ensure that a soldier is ready and able to implement the mission and who is first to die if the situation goes bad. That is the most important change. Officers must value their subordinates and give them well-deserved appreciation.

Next, the mission command concept is very important. It is opposite to the Soviet system where officers hold responsibility for everything and decide all. In the mission command system, the commander or officer gives a clear direction to his subordinates. It is not a detailed plan, so it allows subordinates to contribute to how a mission is conducted. What does it give? Firstly, it gives a wider range of solutions and better flexibility. Secondly, by asking for advice from NCOs, people who are close to the soldiers, we secure plans that are more realistic (sometimes officers are not that close to the ground). Finally, people when contributing to the plan feel more responsible for the imple-



mentation and are more motivated – all this serves for the success of the mission.

What is the average housing compensation in Ukraine?

The housing compensation is between UAH 1,800-3,500 (depending on the region).

What challenges did you face in Lithuania?

If we look at Ukraine and Lithuania from this point of view, there are similarities and differences. What you are doing, we did earlier. The first thing is that the starting point was similar - both states used the Soviet type of experience.

The only difference is that we started building our army from scratch. You already have units, officers, NCOs. In Lithuania, we did not because the Soviet army left our country. In the 1990s we were less ingrained with Soviet things, we were more open to changes. It was a little bit easier for us than in Ukraine to break the old system and change the mentality of the old officers.

How long did it take to build the NCO corps?

From 1996 to 2004, before joining NATO, Lithuania experienced a huge pace of reforms. However, after joining the Alliance we felt a little relaxed - until the war in Ukraine. The conflict in Ukraine was like an awakening that we still have a huge number of things to do. So, it may take at least 10-15 years to implement reforms for NCOs, but without changes in our mentality, we cannot achieve all the objectives of NCO corps reform.

Ukraine is fighting, and you have the political will and support to change. Having experience of reforms in Lithuania, I would say to Ukrainian officers: if you miss this opportunity to make changes now, who knows, after 3-5 years politicians may

have not the same urgency for reforms and you will not have all the outside support you enjoy now. However, in the end, it is all about choosing either a revolutionary or evolutionary path of reforms.

How would you justify the need for a 5-year-long reform to people who lose their loved ones? Is there any rational explanation for that?

The only rationale for any change in the future – making sure that you are not repeating mistakes, and most importantly that you are doing all to save the lives of soldiers.

However, you also have to be realistic to yourself and others about the terms of reforms – 5 years is just the beginning of the long way of fundamental changes to make Ukraine a safer place to live. Also, while reforming organization, changing procedures and practices, applying new training methodologies, or purchasing new equipment and armaments we are not to forget about the most important treasure – people.

Therefore, before any change is to be launched, we should ask ourselves what effect the change will have on our subordinates, people in general.

I also would like to point out that volunteers and people who have lost their loved ones are a much-needed part of the society if you are to pursue reforms. If there were no volunteers, Ukraine would have lost its chance for development, as it was in the 1990s, opposite to the Lithuanian experience. Your current opportunity for a renewal is only due to volunteers and ordinary people.

Other than the financial allowance, is there any other tool to raise the prestige of being an NCO in the Ukrainian army?

Yes. Generally, the success of reforming the NCO corps depends on building motivation. The easiest way is to provide social benefits such as a good financial allowance and housing support, as well as an opportunity to get a better education. Next, what should be done is the creation of a clear career path for NCOs (leaders and specialists). And with each career step, he must be able to do more difficult tasks and be paid correspondingly.

Building this career system takes time. However, what is the most difficult is making NCOs feel proud of being an NCO by doing important things in the army - having more important responsibilities in individual training, morale of soldiers, also having more say in relations with officers while making decisions. These changes only come with hard work on both sides – NCOs and officers building mutual trust. So, in short, education, experience, and hard work will make a change.

Could you please describe the role of the MOD Reforms Project Office in making the army professional?

Firstly, the RPO's advantage is that they are not military and have not served for many years in the AFU. Sometimes, being at one place, you tend to see things in the same way. Any military structure in the Army is very conservative and tends not to make changes. Being an outsider is an advantage of the MOD RPO: they are more acceptable to changes. In addition, as outsiders, you see problems more clearly. Secondly, RPO mostly consists of volunteers who actually at the beginning of the war helped the Ukrainian army to survive and in the end to preserve Ukraine.

Therefore, RPO has built trust among the soldiers, and that matters to linking reforms with actual outcomes for the Ukrainian army.

OVERVIEW OF DEFENCE REFORMS OF UKRAINE / January 2018

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Ministry of Defence of Ukraine



Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
Reforms Project Office






Multinational Exercises of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2017

IN UKRAINE

ABROAD

| DATE | EXERCISE | UKRAINIAN ARMY'S PARTICIPATION |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| ALL YEAR | Multinational tactical training of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine | 4 battalion tactical groups were trained during the year |
| JUL 10–23 | U.S. and Ukraine co-hosted exercise Sea Breeze 2017 | 700 soldiers, 23 ships, 20 aircraft |
| SEP 10–23 | U.S. and Ukraine co-hosted exercise Rapid Trident 2017 | Approximately 1,300 soldiers with armaments and military equipment |
| FEB 20 – MAR 3 | Multinational tactical exercise Platinum Eagle 2017-1 , 📍 Romania | Marine platoon |
| APR 17–29 | Multinational tactical exercise Platinum Eagle 2017-2 , 📍 Romania | Marine platoon |
| MAY 3–13 MAY 24 – JUN 15 | Multinational command-and-staff exercise Combined Resolve-8 , 📍 Germany | Combined tank platoon on T-64BV tanks and a mechanized squadron on BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles with armaments |
| MAY 2 – MAY 19 | Multinational tactical exercise Flaming Sword 2017 , 📍 Lithuania | Special Operations unit with armaments and military equipment |
| JUL 4 – JUL 23 | Multinational tactical exercise Saber Guardian 2017 , 📍 Romania | Mechanized squadron with armaments and military equipment |
| JUL 11 – JUL 20 | Tactical combat training with air defence troops Shabla 2017 , 📍 Bulgaria | Air missile defence troops |
| JUL 30 – AUG 12 | Multinational tactical exercise Noble Partner 2017 , 📍 Georgia | Marine platoon with armaments |
| JUL 31 – AUG 10 | Multinational tactical exercise Platinum Lion 2017 , 📍 Bulgaria | Mechanized squadron with armaments |
| AUG 29–12 | Multinational tactical exercise Agile Spirit 2017 , 📍 Georgia | 2 armed marine platoons, An-26 plane |
| SEP 18–22 | Multinational command-and-staff exercise REGEX 2017 , 📍 Jordan | |
| SEP 25–29 | Multinational command-and-staff exercise Blonde Avalanche 2017 , 📍 Slovakia | |
| OCT 13–22 | Multinational special tactical exercise Cambrian Patrol 2017 , 📍 United Kingdom | Special Operations unit |
| NOV 6–17 | Multinational command-and-staff exercise Maple Arch 2017 , 📍 Poland | |



NATO-Ukraine Annual National Program Results and main achievements in 2017



Personnel Management and Integrity Building

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine together with experts from the Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence developed:

- **Code of conduct and professional ethics** for military officials and civil servants working in the MOD and AFU
- **Strategy of Managing Civil Servants** in the MOD in 2017-2020 and “Rules of Integrity for Corruption Prevention” – Approved 26 April 2017

The **Rules of Integrity for Corruption Prevention** are guidelines for personnel of the MOD and AFU of all levels that explain the fundamental principles of anti-corruption legislation, and provide advice on how to counter and expose corruption in their everyday activities.



Advisory Support

65 foreign advisors from 13 NATO states advise the MOD and General Staff of Ukraine on the implementation of conceptual documents on AFU reform.

Representatives of **6 NATO countries** – U.S., Germany, Canada, Lithuania, UK and Poland – are part of the High-Level Strategic Advisors Group working with the Reforms Committee of the MOD. Their mission is to monitor the implementation of defence reform goals in accordance with the Strategic Defence Bulletin.



Military Radio

With the support of international partners, in 2017 troops in **11** front-line cities of Ukraine could tune in to the first radio station for Ukrainian troops – “**Army FM**”. Overall, the radio station’s coverage expanded to **17** cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.



Cyber Security

The AFU is developing a system of operational (combat) management, communication, intelligence and surveillance through the U.S. Government Program (U-SAI ITI) – supply of equipment and software for the combat management system, Centre for Operational Management and Control (C2C), Data Centre, Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC).

With the help of NATO experts, **4 cybernetic security centres** have been created that detect and block cyber threats to the information systems of the MOD and AFU 24-hours a day.

AFU communications systems are being transitioned to digital equipment that meets NATO standards – **4,742 modern radio sets** have been purchased.

In 2017 Ukraine joined three projects of the Smart Defence concept that involve the sharing of information on cyber attacks, multi-level training of cyber security experts, etc.



Material Support

17 NATO standards have been implemented that regulate requirements for uniforms, individual protective gear and other aspects of material supply.

Supplies for the AFU are being **codified** according to the rules and principles of the NATO Codification System.



Medical Support

Together with experts from the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine, work continues on developing a **Military Medical Doctrine of Ukraine** that is in line with NATO doctrinal documents.

A **system of emergency medical care** was created in the AFU based on the experience of NATO armies.

A **Tactical Medicine Training Centre** has been established at the **169** Training Centre of the Ground Forces. Specialists in tactical medicine are trained using NATO standards.



Training

The AFU has developed a **Concept of Instructors Training and Plan for the Implementation of a Multi-Level NCO Training System** in line with NATO principles and standards.

A **Unit Training Centre** has been established at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre where units of the Ground Forces of Ukraine will be trained according to NATO standards.

2 sniper training schools were opened in Desna and Zhytomyr.

A **Simulation Centre** was opened at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre's Unit Training Centre.

362 service personnel completed **intensive foreign language courses** at higher educational establishments of the AFU in 2017. Another **334** began courses in September 2017.

Canadian instructors trained **nearly 100** specialists in **countering improvised explosive devices** at the **143** Demining Centre.



Social Adaptation of Military Personnel

More than **1,000** active and former military personnel and members of their families completed courses on social adaptation and retraining through **two international projects** – “NATO-Ukraine Program on Retraining of Military Personnel” and the Norway-Ukraine Project “Retraining and Social Adaptation of Military Personnel and their Family Members in Ukraine”.



Defence Planning

A system of training **AFU defence planning specialists** was organized with the assistance of experts from the U.S. and UK.

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has developed and approved the first “Recommendations for Defence Planning Based on the Capacity of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and Armed Forces of Ukraine”.

With British support, the **Defence Management School** is being established at the National Defence University of Ukraine. Its mission is to improve conditions for the rollout of a new defence planning process.



Partnership Programs

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency **approved Ukraine's participation in 3 Alliance Partnerships:** support for demilitarization, dismantling and disposal of military property; naval logistics support; operations logistics.



International Operations

In 2017 the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade **LITPOLUKR-BRIG** achieved operational capability and is now ready to execute peacekeeping missions according to NATO standards.




**INVICTUS
GAMES**
SYDNEY 2018

TEAM UKRAINE

KATERYNA MYKHAILOVA

ATO veteran


Member of Team Ukraine 2017



READY FOR THE NEXT CHALLENGE
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FOLLOW TEAM UKRAINE AT
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ORGANISING COMMITTEE



Ministry of Defence of Ukraine



Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine



Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine



Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine



Ministry of State Policy of Ukraine



Government Office for European and Economic Integration



Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine

COORDINATION



Invictus Games Sydney 2018